Abstract-The need of secure big data storage service is more desirable than ever to date. The basic requirement of the service is to guarantee the confidentiality of the data. However, the anonymity of the service clients, one of the most essential aspects of privacy, should be considered simultaneously. Moreover, the service also should provide practical and fine-grained encrypted data sharing such that a data owner is allowed to share a ciphertext of data among others under some specified conditions. This paper, for the first time, proposes a privacy-preserving ciphertext multi-sharing mechanism to achieve the above properties. It combines the merits of proxy re-encryption with anonymous technique in which a ciphertext can be securely and conditionally shared multiple times without leaking both the knowledge of underlying message and the identity information of ciphertext senders/recipients. Furthermore, this paper shows that the new primitive is secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks in the standard model.
I. INTRODUCTION
T O DATE many individuals and companies choose to upload their data to clouds since the clouds supports considerable data storage service but also efficient data processing capability. Accordingly, it is unavoidable that trillions of personal and industrial data are flooding the Internet. For example, in some smart grid scenario, a governmental surveillance authority may choose to supervise the electricity consumption of a local living district. A great amount of electricity consumed data of each family located inside the district will be automatically transferred to the authority via Internet period by period. The need of big data storage, therefore, is more desirable than ever.
A basic security requirement of big data storage is to guarantee the confidentiality of the data. Fortunately, some existing cryptographic encryption mechanisms can be employed to fulfill the requirement. For instance, Public Key Encryption (PKE) allows a data sender to encrypts the data under the public key of receiver such that no one except the valid recipient can gain access to the data. Nevertheless, this does not satisfy all the requirements of users in the scenario of big data storage.
Consider the following scenario. We suppose a hospital stores its patients' medical records in a cloud storage system and meanwhile, the records are all encrypted so as to avoid the cloud server from accessing to any patient's medical information. After a record is encrypted and further uploaded to the cloud, only those specified doctors can gain access to the record. By using some traditional PKE, Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), or Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), the confidentiality of the record can be protected effectively.
By trivially employing traditional encryption mechanisms (to guarantee the confidentiality of medical record), nevertheless, we cannot prevent some sensitive personal information from being leaked to the cloud server but also the public. This is because traditional encryption systems do not consider the anonymity of a ciphertext sender/receiver. Accordingly, someone, could be anyone with capability of obtaining a ciphertext (e.g. cloud server), may know whose public key the ciphertext is encrypted under, namely who is the owner of the ciphertext, such that the patient associated with the ciphertext can be easily identified. Similarly, the recipient/destination of the ciphertext, e.g., Cardiology Dept., can be known from the ciphertext without any difficulty as well. This seriously disgraces the privacy of patient.
Moreover, a patient might be transferred to more than one medical department in different treatment phases. The corresponding medical record then needs to be converted to the ciphertexts corresponding to various receivers so as to be shared among the departments. Therefore, the update of ciphertext recipient is desirable. Precisely speaking, a fine-grained ciphertext update for receivers is necessary in the sense that a ciphertext can be conditionally shared with others. The medical record owner, e.g., the patient, has rights to decide who can gain access to the record, and which kinds of data are allowed for access. For example, the patient can choose to specify that only the medical record described with "teeth" can be read by a dentist. This fine-grained control prevents a data sharing mechanism from being limited to the "all-or-nothing" share mode.
This research work aims to solve the above problems. To preserve anonymity, some well-known encryption mechanisms are proposed in the literature, such as anonymous IBE [8] . By employing these primitives, the source and the destination of data can be protected privately. However, the primitives cannot support the update of ciphertext receiver.
There are some naive approaches to update ciphertext's recipient. For instance, data owner can employ the decryptthen-re-encrypt mode. Nonetheless, this is applicable to the scenario where there is only a small amount of data. If the encrypted data is either a group of sequences of genome information or a network audit log, the decryption and re-encryption might be time consumed and computation costly. Moreover, this mode also suffers from a limitation that the data owner has to be on-line all the time. Alternatively, a fully trusted third party with knowledge of the decryption key of the data owner may be delegated to handle the task. Nevertheless, this strongly relies on the fully trust of the party. Besides, the anonymity of the ciphertext receiver cannot be achieved as the party needs to know the information of recipient to proceed the re-encryption. Therefore, both of the approaches do not scale well in practice.
Introduced by Mambo and Okamoto [26] and further defined in [5] , Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) is proposed to tackle the dilemma of data sharing. It allows a semi-trusted party, called proxy, to transform a ciphertext intended for a user into a ciphertext of the same message intended for another user without leaking knowledge of either the decryption keys or the message. The workload of data owner is now transferred to the proxy, and the "on-line all the time" requirement is unnecessary.
This work concentrates on the identity-based cryptographic setting. To employ PRE in the IBE setting, [17] defined the notion of Identity-Based Proxy Re-Encryption (IBPRE), which offers a practical solution for access control in networked file storage [17] , and secure email with IBE [17] . To capture privacy-preserving property and ciphertext's recipient update simultaneously, [30] proposed an anonymous IBPRE system, which is CCA security in the Random Oracle Model (ROM).
The valuable work [30] introduces the first anonymous IBPRE in the literature and meanwhile, it leaves us interesting and meaningful open problems. The work only supports one-time ciphertext receiver update, while multiple receivers update is desirable in practice. On the other hand, the work provides an "all-or-nothing" share mode that limits the flexibility of data sharing.
A. Our Contributions
In this paper, we aim to propose a ciphertext sharing mechanism with the following properties:
• Anonymity: given a ciphertext, no one knows the identity information of sender and receiver.
• Multiple receiver-update: given a ciphertext, the receiver of the ciphertext can be updated in multiple times. In this paper, we refer to this property as "multi-hop".
• Conditional sharing: a ciphertext can be fine-grained shared with others if the pre-specified conditions are satisfied.
Achievements: We investigate a new notion, AMH-IBCPRE. We formalize the definition and security model by incorporating the definitions in [31] and [32] . In the security model, we allow the corrupted users to be adaptively chosen by an adversary, while the adversary must output the challenge identity at the outset of security game. Moreover, we define four security models for different practical purposes.
• The security model of MH-IBCPRE is the basic one, in which a challenger plays the game with the adversary to launch Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks (CCA) to the original ciphertext and re-encrypted ciphertext in order to solve a hard problem.
• We also consider the case where a proxy colludes with delegatee to compromise the underlying message and the secret key of delegator. Here, the protection of the message is very difficult to achieve as the delegatee can always decrypt the corresponding ciphertext for the proxy. The secret key of the delegator, however, is possible to be secured.
• For the definition of collusion attacks model, we allow an adversary to acquire all re-encryption keys, and the adversary wins the game if it outputs a valid secret key of an uncorrupted user. We note that our definition is in the selective model in which the adversary has to output a target identity at the outset of the game.
• As to the security model of anonymity, it is complicated in the sense that we categorize the game into two subgames: one is the anonymity for delegator (i.e. given the original ciphertext an adversary cannot output the identity of delegator), the other is the anonymity of re-encryption key (i.e. an adversary cannot distinguish a valid re-encryption key from a random one belonging to re-encryption key space). We next propose a concrete construction for unidirectional AMH-IBCPRE, in which it achieves multiple ciphertext receiver update, conditional data sharing, anonymity and collusion-safe (i.e. holding against collusion attacks) simultaneously in asymmetric bilinear group. Note the functionality of our system is generally described in Fig 1. We state that the new primitive is applicable to many real-world applications, such as secure email forwarding, electronic encrypted data sharing, where both anonymity and flexible encrypted data sharing are needed. We also show that the scheme is CCA-secure in the standard model under the decisional P-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. To the best of our knowledge, our system is the first of its kind in the literature.
B. Related Work
Following the concept of delegation of decryption rights introduced by Mambo and Okamoto [26] , Blaze et al. [5] formalized the concept of PRE, and proposed a seminal bidirectional PRE scheme. Afterwards, many PRE schemes have been proposed, such as [2] , [3] , [11] , [18] - [20] , [22] , [24] , and [25] .
Employing traditional PRE in the context of IBE, Green and Ateniese [17] initially introduced the notion of IBPRE, and proposed two unidirectional IBPRE schemes in the ROM: one is CPA secure and the other holds against CCA. Later on, two CPA-secure IBE-PRE schemes (in the types of PKE-IBE and IBE-IBE) [27] have been proposed. Afterwards, some IBPRE systems have been proposed for various requirements (see [28] , [34] ).
In the multiple ciphertext receiver update 1 scenario, Green and Ateniese [17] proposed the first MH-IBPRE scheme with CPA security. Later on, a RCCA-secure MH-IBPRE scheme without random oracles was proposed by Chu and Tzeng [12] . These schemes, however, are not collusion-safe. To solve the problem, Shao and Cao [31] proposed a CCA-secure MH-IBPRE in the standard model with collusion-safe property.
To hide the information leaked from re-encryption key, Ateniese et al. [1] defined the notion of key-privacy (i.e. an adversary cannot identify delegator and delegatee even given re-encryption key). Later on, Shao et al. [33] revised the security model introduced in [1] . To prevent a ciphertext from being traced, Emura et al. [15] proposed a unidirectional IBPRE scheme in which an adversary cannot identify the source from the destination ciphertext. To ensure the privacy of both delegator and delegatee, Shao et al. [32] proposed the first Anonymous PRE (ANO-PRE) system. The system guarantees that an adversary cannot identify the recipient of original and re-encrypted ciphertext even given the corresponding re-encryption key. In 2012, Shao [30] also proposed the first anonymous IBPRE with CCA security in the ROM.
In the context of IBE/ABE, some well-known systems supporting anonymity that have been proposed, such as [8] , [9] , [16] , and [29] . Leveraging them may partially fulfill our goals. However, we need to focus on the combination of anonymity and ciphertext update properties. Therefore, the aforementioned systems are not taken in comparison below.
Here, we compare our work with the some related systems, and summarize the comparison of properties in Table I . While multiple ciphertext receiver update (denoting as M.U.), conditional (data) share, collusion resistance (denoting as C.R.), anonymity, and without random oracle (denoting as W.R.O.), have all five been partially achieved by previous schemes, 
B. Threat Models
We define four models in terms of the selective condition and selective identity chosen ciphertext security (IND-sConsID-CCA), collusion resistance, the anonymity of the original ciphertext and anonymity of the re-encryption key in this section. Before proceeding, we define some notations.
• 
If there is no corrupted identity in the chain, it is an uncorrupted delegation chain. Else, it is corrupted. Definition 2: A unidirectional MH-IBCPRE scheme is IND-sCon-sID-CCA-secure if no PPT adversary A can win the game below with non-negligible advantage. In the game, B is the game challenger and k is the security parameter. 1) Init. A outputs a challenge identity I D * ∈ {0, 1} * and a challenge condition w ∈ {0, 1} * . 2) Setup. B runs setup(1 k ) and returns mpk to A. 3) Phase 1. A is given access to the following oracles.
and I D i , and a condition w, output rk w,
In this phase the followings are forbidden to issue:
4) Challenge. A outputs two equal length messages m 0 , m 1 , and a set of identities
where l * ≥ 2, l * ∈ N, b ∈ R {0, 1}. Note that we here put I D * to the l * level of the ciphertext. This shows no difference from putting it in the first level of the ciphertext since the system supports multi-hop property. 5) Phase 2. Same as in Phase 1 except the followings:
, and I D i is in a corrupted delegation chain. As of [11] , a derivative of
We now proceed to collusion resistance that guarantees that an adversary cannot compromise the entire secret key of a delegator even if it colludes with the delegatee. 
where k is the security parameter, 
Finally, we define the anonymity of the re-encryption key (ANO-RK), in which an adversary cannot distinguish a real re-encryption key from a random one. 
(derivative of) ciphertext generated by a re-encryption key in the delegation chain under w * from I D * to I D i , and I D i is in a corrupted delegation chain; and
(derivative of) ciphertext generated by a re-encryption key in the delegation chain under w
Remark: As sated in [1] , the anonymity of the re-encrypted ciphertext is implied by the anonymity of the re-encryption key, we hence omit the details here.
III. PRELIMINARIES

A. Asymmetric Pairings
Let B Setup be an algorithm that on input the security parameter k, outputs the parameters of a bilinear map as (q, g,ĝ, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e) , where G 1 , G 2 and G T are multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order q, where |q| = k, and g is a random generator of G 1 ,ĝ is a random generator of G 2 . The mapping e : G 1 × G 2 → G T has three properties:
Computability: e can be efficiently computed.
Asymmetric Decisional BDH (ADBDH) Problem [14] : Given a tuple (g, g a , g c ,ĝ,ĝ a ,ĝ b 
(Asymmetric) Decisional P-BDH Problem [14] : Given a tuple (g, g a , g ab , g c ,ĝ,ĝ a ,ĝ 
where the probability is over the random choice of generators g ∈ G 1 andĝ ∈ G 2 , the random choice of exponents a, b, c ∈ Z * q , T ∈ G T , and the random bits used by A. We say that the ADBDH assumption holds in (G 1 , G 2 ) if no PPT algorithm has advantage in solving the ASBDH problem in (G 1 , G 2 ). Definition 7 ((Asymmetric) Decisional P-BDH Assumption [14] ): We say that an algorithm A has advantage , g a , g ab , g c ,ĝ,ĝ a ,ĝ b , T ) = 0]| ≥ , where the probability is over the random choice of generators g ∈ G 1 andĝ ∈ G 2 , the random choice of exponents a, b, c ∈ Z * q , T ∈ G 1 , and the random bits used by A. We say that the decisional P-BDH assumption holds in (G 1 , G 2 ) if no PPT algorithm has advantage in solving the decisional P-BDH problem.
B. Building Blocks Strongly Existential Unforgeable One-Time Signatures:
A strongly existential unforgeable (sUF) one-time signature [4] consists of the following algorithms:
on input a security parameter k ∈ N, the algorithm outputs a signing/ verification key pair ( 
C. An Anonymous IBE and Its Extensions
Ducas [14] introduces an efficient anonymous IBE (Du-ANO-IBE) scheme in the standard model. We review its construction below, and omit the definition and security model of Du-ANO-IBE as the details can be found in [14] .
• Setup (1 k 
The master secret key msk = (ĝ 0 =ĝ αβ ,f ,t), the master public key mpk = (g,ĝ, g 1 , h, f, t,ĝ 2 ,ĥ).
• Extract(msk, ID): given msk and an identity I D ∈ Z * q , randomly choose r, R ∈ Z * q , output
using the private key sk I D to recover the plaintext m =
. By Theorem 1 and its corresponding security proof in [14] , we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Du-ANO-IBE is selective-ID (sID) anonymous and secure against chosen-plaintext attacks assuming the decisional P-BDH assumption holds.
Below we employ the BB1 HIBE technique [6] to extend Du-ANO-IBE to be a two levels encryption scheme without losing CPA security, where the first level is the identity, and the second level is the condition. We state that the first level is anonymous, but the second level is not.
• Setup(1 k ): let w ∈ Z * q be a condition, and choose α, β, γ , δ 1 , δ 2 , η ∈ R Z * q , and set
) which is generated in the algorithm E xtract of Du-ANO-IBE, one can easily derive the above secret key by using the BB1 construction technique. To achieve the consistency of algorithm description, we here use the "same" secret key generation expression.
• Enc(mpk, ID, m, w):
. We refer to the above system as 2-level Du-ANO-HIBE. As stated in [14] , Du-ANO-IBE can be extended to 2-level system to achieve CCA security via BB1 HIBE construction technique. The above system is exactly the converted 2-level system except that the second level is a condition instead of a verification key (of a one-time signature). Here the CPA security of 2-level Du-ANO-HIBE still relies on the decisional P-BDH assumption, and the corresponding proof is straightforward to reuse the proof technique presented in [14] . Therefore, we have the following theorem. Theorem 2: 2-level Du-ANO-HIBE is anonymous and CPA secure assuming the decisional P-BDH assumption holds.
D. A CCA-Secure 3-Level Du-ANO-HIBE
Here we convert 2-level Du-ANO-HIBE to achieve CCA security by using the CHK transformation [10] . Following the BB1 HIBE construction, a 3-level CCA-secure anonymous system, which is anonymous relative to the first level but not the second and third levels, can be built as follows.
• Setup(1 k ): same as the algorithm Setup of 2-level Du-ANO-HIBE except the followings. Choose random values δ 3 ∈ Z * q , and set f 3 = g δ 3 andf 3 =ĝ δ 3 . Choose an sUF one-time signature scheme (Sig.K G, Sign, V er) and set the verification key K v is in Z * q , where k 1 is the security parameter. The master public key mpk = (g,ĝ,
, where r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , R ∈ Z * q . To achieve consistency of description, we keep the secret key generation in one algorithm. Actually, given the secret key of 2-level Du-ANO-HIBE, one can easily derive the above key.
• Enc(mpk, ID, m, K v ): choose s ∈ R Z * q and a one-time signature key pair (
If the equations do not hold, output ⊥. The proof is straight forward to reuse the technique in [14] .
IV. SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION
A. Construction Details
We allow condition and identities to be arbitrary length, but they should be hashed by a Target Collision Resistant (TCR) hash function [13] 
Choose two TCR hash functions: 
• Extract(msk, ID): Given msk and an identity
After receiving the secret key from PKG, the user can check the key as:
1 ∈ R Z * q and a one-time signature key pair
2 ∈ R Z * q and a one-time signature key pair (K (1) (1) 0 )/e(C 5 ,rk (1) 1 ) e(C 3 ,rk (1) 2 )·e(C 4 ,rk (1) 3 )
, σ (1) 
10 , rk
, rk
If Eq. (2) and (3) do not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, proceed.
• Dec (sk I D i , C l,I D i ,w ) .
If Eq. (4) and (5) do not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, proceed.
2 as in the previous steps. g) Recover
if Eq. (1) holds.
B. Security Analysis
Theorem 4: Our AMH-IBCPRE scheme is IND-sCon-sID-CCA secure assuming the decisional P-BDH assumption holds, (Sig.K G, Sign, V er) is a sUF one-time signature scheme, SY M is a CCA-secure one-time symmetric key encryption and H 1 , H 2 are TCR hash functions.
Please refer to Appendix A for the proof of Theorem 4. Theorem 5: Our AMH-IBCPRE scheme is selective collusion resistant.
Please refer to Appendix B for the proof of Theorem 5. Theorem 6: Our AMH-IBCPRE scheme achieves ANO-OC assuming the decisional P-BDH assumption holds, (Sig.K G, Sign, V er) is a sUF one-time signature scheme, SY M is a CCA-secure one-time symmetric key encryption and H 1 , H 2 are TCR hash functions.
Please refer to Appendix C for the proof of Theorem 6. Theorem 7: Our AMH-IBCPRE scheme achieves ANO-RK assuming the decisional P-BDH assumption holds, (Sig.K G, Sign, V er) is a sUF one-time signature scheme, SY M is a CCA-secure one-time symmetric key encryption and H 1 , H 2 are TCR hash functions.
Please refer to Appendix D for the proof of Theorem 7.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We introduced a novel notion, anonymous multi-hop identity-based conditional proxy re-encryption, to preserve the anonymity for ciphertext sender/receiver, conditional data sharing and multiple recipient-update. We further proposed a concrete system for the notion. Meanwhile, we proved the system CCA-secure in the standard model under the decisional P-bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. To the best of our knowledge, our primitive is the first of its kind in the literature. which are identical to rk
. B then generates the rest of components of the re-encryption key as in the real scheme, and adds (I D i , I D j , w, rk 
, constructs symmetric encryption σ (1) • I D i , w, K v ), C 1,I D i ,w )) to O decr ypt , and returns m.
), and , and the running time of B is O(ti me(A)), where q rk , q re , q dec are the total numbers of re-encryption key extraction, re-encryption and decryption queries, respectively.
B. Proof of Theorem 5
Proof: In the game of Definition 2, an adversary A is allowed to gain access to the re-encryption keys 
C. Proof of Theorem 6
Proof: If an adversary A can break the ANO-OC security of our scheme, we construct an algorithm B to solve the decisional P-BDH problem by using A. • Guess. B outputs whatever A outputs. The probability analysis is the same as that of Theorem 4. Therefore, the advantage of B is at least
Adv AN O-OC
A
(1 k )(q rk +q re +q dec ) 2q
, and the running time of B is O (ti me(A) ).
D. Proof of Theorem 7
Proof: Supposing there is an adversary A who can break the ANO-RK security of our scheme, we can construct an algorithm B to solve the decisional P-BDH problem in (G 1 , G 2 ) by using A. 
